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 In 1805 the commercial frontier town of Detroit completely burned to the ground.  
Within weeks, the new Michigan territorial government had devised an elaborate plan to rebuild 
the town, indeed to build a city.  The citizens were first delighted, but they quickly grew 
disillusioned, when the plan led to lengthy delays that kept the town from being fully rebuilt for 
years.  One hundred and thirty-five years later, beginning in 1940, the city of Detroit, by then the 
fourth largest city in the United States, devised a new plan to deliberately tear down major 
portions of the city.  As in 1805, an elaborate plan was devised, which first delighted the citizens 
and then appalled them, as delays and division resulted in gaping holes in the heart of the city. 
 How can we draw parallels between these two events, one an attempt to rebuild a city on 
the frontier after a fire, the other an early urban redevelopment effort in a huge industrial city? 
As this paper will show, in both cases top down planning, with little input from the citizenry, led 
to substantial resistance and serious delays, resulting in incomplete implementation, and a 
consequent failure to meet objectives.  In both cases, large numbers of residents went without 
adequate shelter for lengthy periods of time.  And in both cases, the ultimate beneficiaries were 
wealthy elites, while the ostensible targets of the plans were, in most cases, displaced. 
 Detroit in both 1805 and 1940 was a city in the midst of great changes.  In 1805, the city 
had functionally been part of the United States for only nine years, since the Jay Treaty was 
implemented in 1796.  During those nine years Detroit had been part of two distant territorial 
governments, first based out of Ohio, and then Indiana, before being granted its own territorial 
status as the capitol of the new Michigan Territory in 1805.  The new nation was mired in a 
series of disputes with Great Britain that seemed to possibly be leading to war, which would 
come in 1812.  With British territory just a half-mile across the Detroit River, war with the 
greatest empire of the time was a fearsome prospect.  In 1940, Detroit was just coming out of the 
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Great Depression, and was actively starting to engage with its emerging role as the American 
“arsenal of democracy” for World War II.  The city had been devastated by the Depression, more 
so than most of the nation, and found itself with obsolete housing and infrastructure that needed 
to be replaced to mesh with the new automobile age that it had helped to create.  At both time 
periods Detroit was facing the threat of war and trying to find a new role for itself in a rapidly 
changing world.   
 One other factor ties these two cases together; both were an attempt to impose a vision of 
modernity on a benighted community.  In 1805, the benighted community was a town composed 
primarily of former French subjects and their descendants, most of whom spoke little or no 
English.  In 1940, the benighted communities were composed of poor slum-dwelling African 
Americans and immigrants, who had little money and less political power.   
 Modernity is a tricky subject, much talked about, but not often well defined.  In an 
attempt to define “modern,” Chandan Reddy shows how the term has had different definitions 
and periodizations, depending on the discipline and time period.  For our purposes, there is no 
point in trying to define a particular period at which modernity “began,” rather, our interest is in 
how the participants saw it.  Reddy argues, "It was only with the rise of the European 
enlightenment in the mid-18th century that "modern" took on the sense of a qualitative claim 
about the newness of the times, in the sense of there being "completely other, even better than 
what has gone before.”  This distinction between the contemporary newness and the 
traditionalism of the past became more important in the colonial context:  
Largely through the force of British and European colonialism, the term was no longer 
contrasted with "antiquity," but instead with "backwardness," a category that 
encompasses both "older civilizations" in decline and "primitive societies" frozen in an 
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earlier moment of human history. Whole societies, peoples and art forms were now 
classifiable as primitive, degenerate, or modern, with the latter positioned as the leading 
edge of historical time and serving as the measure of human perfectibility." 1 
This idea is most clearly useful as context for the case of Detroit in 1805, with its largely French 
population being brought into the “enlightened” society of the newly formed United States.  As 
we will see, it also serves reasonably well for Detroit of the 1940s and 1950s, with its large 
population of African Americans and poor immigrants who were often viewed as degenerate and 
sources of vice. 
 There is yet another view of modernity that can help inform our understanding of Detroit 
in both periods.  The attempt to impose modernity on a more traditional people is characteristic 
of modern states.  In Thinking Like a State, James Scott argues that one of the first tasks of the 
modern state was “the administrative ordering of nature and society,” i.e., to structure its 
environment and to characterize and count characteristics of the environment (e.g., to count 
people, trees, the values of property).  The creation of land-use maps based on surveys creates 
what Scott calls “legibility,” i.e., enabling the state to “read” the environment, whether natural or 
urban.  While eighteenth century French and British colonizers were mostly content to trade furs 
and skins with the native inhabitants of the Detroit area, the Americans who arrived beginning in 
1796 were primarily focused on preparing the land for large-scale settlement by white Americans.  
Thus, rather than creating simple maps of the territory, suitable for navigation and hunting, the 
Americans needed to order the entire place in detail by survey.2 
                                                 
1 Chandan Reddy, “Modern,” in Keywords for American Cultural Studies, Bruce Bergett and Glenn Hendler, eds. 
(New York, New York University Press, 2007), 160. 
2 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State:  How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven:  Yale University Press 1998), 44, 50-51. 
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Scott discusses another characteristic of states attempting to impose modernity: an 
ideology of “high modernism.”  This is an unbounded confidence in the ability of science and 
technology to produce progress toward a well-ordered, rational, better world.  A key aspect of 
high modernism is the belief that if a place looks well ordered it must function better. Scott links 
high modernist ideology to twentieth century urban renewal.  He is particularly critical of famed 
city planner Le Corbusier, who proposed the complete replacement of large sections of cities 
with his geometrically simple, orderly designs in which millions of people would live.  While Le 
Corbusier was never able to complete any of his extravagant designs, his ideas were 
tremendously influential in the city planning community.  Urban redevelopment efforts that 
stressed the removal of disorder and its replacement with modernist “superblocks” became 
standard practice in American cities, including Detroit, beginning in the 1930s and through the 
1960s.3 
 
The Great Fire of 1805 
 
 Detroit was founded in 1701 by the French explorer Cadillac as a fur-trading center.  
Cadillac laid the town out in the form of a military camp, with small lots and narrow streets.   
Figure 1 shows the layout of the fort in 1749, substantially enlarged from Cadillac’s small 
stockade.  Around the fort are the “ribbon farms” where many settlers lived.4   
                                                 
3 Scott, 104-117. 
4 Scott Martelle, Detroit: a biography (Chicago:  Chicago Review Press, 2014), 1-7; Brian Leigh 
Dunnigan, Frontier Metropolis:  Picturing Early Detroit, 1701-1838 (Detroit:  Wayne State University Press, 2001), 
40, 42.  
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Figure 1.  French Detroit5 
Detroit grew to about two thousand inhabitants by 1763, when the British gained control 
after the Seven Years War.  In 1783, Detroit was included in the British cession after the 
American Revolution, but they refused to vacate until 1796 in compliance with the Jay Treaty.  
Michigan became a separate territory in 1805, with Detroit as its capitol.6   
For the government of the new Michigan Territory, President Thomas Jefferson 
appointed General William Hull, a Revolutionary War veteran from Connecticut, as the 
Governor, and Augustus Woodward and Frederick Bates as Judges. Woodward was a friend of 
Jefferson’s, who had become a prominent lawyer and real estate investor in Washington.  Bates 
already resided in the city.7  Hull and Woodward set out for Detroit and planned to arrive for the 
installation ceremony on July 1, 1805.  But on June 11 the whole city burned down.  Woodward 
                                                 
5 http://www.library.yale.edu/MapColl/oldsite/map/detr1764.gif, accessed June 26, 2016. 
6 Cangany, 125-130. 
7 Thomas Maitland Marshall, ed., The Life and Papers of Frederick Bates, Volume 1 (St. Louis, MO:  Missouri 
Historical Society, 1926), 7; Woodford, 13-14. 
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arrived on June 30.  When a meeting of the people on July 1 proposed to rebuild the town as it 
had been, Woodward and Bates suggested waiting until Governor Hull arrived to help sort things 
out.  Hull arrived that evening.8  Figure 2 shows the town at the American takeover in 1796 with 
an overlay of current streets to provide context.   
 
Figure 2.  Detroit in 17969 
 One consequence of the new Territory was the elimination of representative government.  
The only government was the Governor and Judges, appointed by the President. Those four men 
                                                 
8 Silas Farmer, History of Detroit and Wayne County and Early Michigan:  A Chronological Cyclopedia of the Past 
and Present, Third Revision (Detroit:  Gale, 1969, originally published by Silas Farmer & Co., 1890), 26. 
9 Farmer, 33.  
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comprised the executive, court, legislative board, and land board.  The only formal recourse to 
their decisions was to petition Congress in Washington.  This meant that all decisions about how 
to rebuild would be up to the Governor and Judges.10 
 The townspeople were of two minds about rebuilding.  One faction, composed primarily 
of the French-speaking descendants of the original residents, wanted to rebuild quickly on the 
existing lots.  The other faction, primarily newer American arrivals, wanted to rebuild as a 
modern city, with wider streets and larger lots.  Governor Hull sided with the Americans, and 
appointed Judge Woodward as a one-man planning commission.11   
 Woodward’s plan was not a traditional gridiron, but rather an imaginative complex of 
triangles, plazas, circles, and irregular lots (Figure 3).  It included wide streets, with principal 
avenues 200 feet wide and secondary streets 120 feet wide.  In contrast, old Detroit had streets 
that were ten to thirty feet wide, with the narrow streets contributing to the destructiveness of the 
fire.12  
 Detroit in 1805 occupied a small space of about twenty acres by the river.  In contrast, 
Woodward’s full plan was enormous, extending over the existing “commons13,” and crossing the 
existing ribbon farms.  Although the plan was initially well received by the inhabitants, there 
were concerns.  In a letter to the Secretary of War, Henry Dearborn, Woodward notes the 
Army’s desire to keep the space between the fort and the river clear for observation.  This 
however, was the site of the old town, and the residents valued it highly: 
                                                 
10 Farmer, 134-135. 
11 Cangany, 147. 
12 Buford L Pickens, “Early City Plans for Detroit, A Projected American Metropolis,” Art Quarterly, 6 (1943), 34-
51. 
13 The “commons” refers to land held by the entire community for shared use by all members of the community.  A 
typical use of this land was for grazing cattle. The modernist perspective held that such land holdings were not as 
productive as lands used more intensively by individual landowners. 
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All the attachment of the inhabitants is to the old spot.  They have none of the 
expectations with respect to the prosperity of their country, which are so common 
elsewhere, and which those who have seen what has been effected in various parts of the 
United States very justly entertain.  They value all the ground within the vicinity of the 
old town enormously rich, and all the rest scarcely worth any thing.14 
 
 
Figure 3.  1807 Woodward Plan 
In this letter to Dearborn, Woodward impugns the patriotism of the (mostly French-speaking) 
“inhabitants” and notes their lack of vision and sophistication. He reminds Dearborn that the 
people of the city are not well integrated into the American way of life.   
The site of St. Anne’s Catholic Church was a major point of contention, since its 
cemetery was in the line of fire from the fort.  Woodward proposed to move it, but the 
                                                 
14 Woodward to Henry Dearborn, March 5, 1806, Box 2, File 1806 Jan – Oct, Woodward Papers, BHC. 
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inhabitants objected strongly to moving their ancestors.  Woodward backed down temporarily, 
but it remained a sore spot for many years.15 
After the fire, those who could afford to rebuild immediately were assigned plots of land 
and permission to build.  By October of 1805, some thirty homes had been built or started.  
These would be the last homes built until after 1807.  Woodward and Hull left for Washington in 
October 1805 to obtain Congressional approval; this was required so the Territorial government 
could allocate Federal lands to the citizens in exchange for their previous properties which were 
displaced by the streets and new lot arrangements.16 
 Six months later, on April 21, 1806 Congress approved the Woodward Plan.  The 
legislation was generous, allowing landholders to exchange their property for other lots in the 
city, and providing free lots to every inhabitant on the day of the fire.  These became known as 
“donation lots.”  The legislation assigned 10,000 acres of public lands to be used for donation 
lots or to be sold to fund public buildings.  The 10,000 acres included the existing “commons” 
north of the fort, as well as land further north of the city17.  Woodward and Hull returned from 
Washington to much approval by Detroiters.   That was the last bit of political harmony the city 
would see for years.18 
 The first problem the Governor and Judges encountered upon their return was to decide 
who would get which lots.  Given the preference of almost everyone for land on or near the river, 
choosing who would get those was a political minefield.  Meeting as the Land Board on 
September 6, 1806, the Governor and Judges decided to sell riverfront and corner lots, and use 
                                                 
15 Woodward to Charles Moran, August 17, 1805, Box 2, File 1805, Woodward Papers, BHC. 
16 Hull to Henry Dearborn, September 22, 1805, Box 2, File 1805, William Hull Papers BHC. 
17 One implication of this is that the federal government appropriated the “commons” land viewed by the French 
inhabitants as owned in common by the whole city.  This was in accord with the modernist view that such land held 
in common was not being used for its most productive purpose.  The inhabitants of course disagreed, to no effect. 
18 Farmer, 27; Woodford, 44-45; Dunnigan, 51, 167. 
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less desirable properties as donation lots.  Many citizens objected strongly to this, so on October 
6 the Land Board met again, this time to ask the citizens how they wanted to distribute the land.  
There is no record of how the argument proceeded, but we know that by December 1806 
donation lots had been distributed to 251people.19 
But, three weeks later, Hull began to question this distribution after realizing that many 
recipients had not taken the oath of allegiance to the United States.  The 1806 law distributed lots 
to everyone who “inhabited a house in Detroit at the time of the fire, and who does not profess or 
owe allegiance to any foreign power."20  The Jay Treaty said that residents had one year to 
declare their allegiance to Britain.  If they did not, they would be considered citizens of the 
United States.  Thus, anyone who did not swear allegiance to Britain should have been eligible.  
Hull interpreted this differently.  As many as two-thirds of the initial recipients may have been 
disqualified.21 
It is unclear what were the ultimate criteria used to allocate property, although we know 
that only 158 donation lots were ultimately distributed. Furthermore, not all donation lots went to 
residents of the city at the time of the fire.  Hull assigned himself one of the best lots on Jefferson 
Avenue, near the Detroit River, and other late arrivals also received donation lots.22 
The arbitrary nature of these decisions led citizens to seek redress.  On December 12, 
1806, a petition was presented to the Legislative Board, complaining about Judge Woodward 
(who was a member of the Board, along with the Governor and his fellow Judges).  Among the 
many complaints was that, “he has begun a partial project, which injures and will reduce to 
                                                 
19 Farmer, 27-28. 
20 Clarence Burton, History of Detroit 1780 to 1850:  Financial and Commercial. Detroit:  Report of the 
Historiographer, 1917, 310. 
21 Woodford, 47-48. 
22 Farmer, 27-28; Woodford, 47. 
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Misery all the Inhabitants of the Territory in throwing all the advantages on the side of the 
Speculators.”  This almost certainly refers to the Woodward Plan, which took land used as a 
common and platted it out into city blocks to be sold.  The petition also complains that 
Woodward was digging wells “for the animals in the woods,” a reference to Woodward’s 
proposal to provide services in the outlying and uninhabited new blocks of the city.23 
In September 1809, the Grand Jury of the Michigan Territory, consisting of 17 citizens, 
accused Governor Hull and the Judges of greatly exceeding their powers. They accused Hull of 
paying for land surveys to be done out of tax dollars, when they should have been paid for from 
the sale of lands.  They also declared that several laws passed by the legislative board were 
unconstitutional, and they objected to Hull “forcing Aliens and renegade Negros” into the militia, 
when it should have been reserved for “free, white, males.”24  Shortly after the Grand Jury 
accusation, a memorial was sent to President James Madison asking for Hull’s removal.  The 
memorial accuses Hull of being incompetent, providing favors for friends, and profiting from the 
sale of goods to the Indians.25 
Word of this discord reached far and wide.  In a letter from Frederick Bates in St. Louis 
to Woodward in February 1808, Bates describes rumors about the “absurd accusations against 
Governor Hull and yourself.”  He has heard that impeachment is possible, but he encourages 
Woodward to not fear this, since he would be able to publicly defend himself and would surely 
be exonerated.  Clearly the inhabitants had found a way to fight authority.26 
                                                 
23 “Deliberations of the Principal Free Holders of the Northeast Coast, Presented to the Legislature of Michigan by 
George McDougall on December 12, 1806,” Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society (MPHS), 579-581.   
24 “Action of the Grand Jury Relative to Governor Hull,” signed by Geo. Hoffman, Foreman, September 26, 1809, 
MPHS, 587-589. 
25 “Memorial to the President for the Removal of Governor Hull,” unsigned, January 24, 1810, MPHS, 592. 
26 Frederick Bates to Augustus Woodward, Feb. 23, 1808, MPHS, 561-562. 
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The ability to build on a property depends on knowing its actual boundaries, which 
requires a physical survey.  In 1806, Hull appointed Thomas Smith to conduct a survey. Smith 
began work quickly, but he was a Canadian.  In January 1807, U.S. Surveyor General Jared 
Mansfield replaced him with Abijah Hull, a cousin of the Governor.  After a year of working, 
Surveyor Hull had completed no surveys, and as a result no buildings were erected in that time.  
After much public outcry, Hull began work, but so incompetently that he was publicly 
humiliated and resigned.27 
Hull’s problems were not all of his own making.  Property owners were uncooperative 
and resisted having their lands surveyed, at least in part because the government wanted them to 
pay for it, but also because they could see no use in it.  In effect, the inhabitants were not only 
resisting the Plan but also the entire modernization effort to bring the territory under the formal 
systems of the United States.28   
A third survey in 1808 did no better.  As a result, there was no baseline on which to sell 
property or to proceed with the Plan.  In desperation, the Land Board parceled out properties 
using old landmarks and property lines.   The result was such a mess that, in February 1809, 
during Woodward’s absence from the city, Governor Hull and one of the Judges repealed the 
Plan.  Upon his return Woodward declared the action illegal, since the Congressionally-
mandated plan could not be repealed by the Territorial government.  Work on the city was 
further delayed by the War of 1812.  Hull’s speedy surrender to the British in 1812 resulted in 
his replacement by Lewis Cass in October 1813.29   
                                                 
27 Cangany, 157-158. 
28  A. Hull to US Surveyor General Jared Mansfield, 3 Nov 1807, Territorial Papers of the U.S., 10, 150-52, cited in 
Genser, 29. 
29 Cangany, 158-159. 
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Cass reappointed the original surveyor, Thomas Smith, in 1814 and he wrestled with the 
conflicting claims and haphazard rebuilding.  In 1816 Smith completed his survey, which 
included Woodward’s angular roads cutting across existing farms.  The farmers, including 
Governor Cass, who had become a major landowner, objected strenuously.  In October 1816, the 
Land Board ended the Woodward Plan’s streets where they exist today, with a half-completed 
Grand Circus Park and only a few radial streets.  The rest of the city would be laid out with 
rectangular blocks.  In 1829, the city petitioned Congress to repeal the Plan, and Congress 
complied, ending the Woodward Plan forever.30  
Mid-Century Urban Renewal 
 Flash forward to 1945 and Detroit was a very different place.  With more than 1.6 million 
people, Detroit was America’s fourth largest city and the center of its automobile industry. But, 
beginning in 1927, Detroit had been in a uniquely depressed state, although the economy had 
revived during the war.  However, spending on public works had been minimal for 15 years, and 
except for a small amount of public housing, there had been no new homes built.  As part of its 
1949 Master Plan, the city proposed two major urban renewal efforts to replace dilapidated 
housing near the downtown:  the Gratiot Redevelopment Project and the Westside Industrial 
Redevelopment Project.31 
 The city was highly segregated.  The nine percent of the population that was African-
American was concentrated on the east side of downtown in one of the oldest parts of the city 
                                                 
30 Cangany, 159-163. 
31 Thomas, 14; ; Detroit Master Plan, Detroit City Plan Commission, 1951, 70-96. 
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known as Black Bottom32.  Black migrants from the south, drawn to the city by the auto industry, 
were almost all forced to squeeze into the deteriorated housing in this area.33 
 In 1946, the Detroit Housing Commission created The Detroit Plan:  A Program for 
Blight Elimination.  This was one of the first programs in the nation to use public-private 
collaboration in housing and urban renewal. The city would assemble and clear sites for 
redevelopment, which would be turned over to private developers.  The intent of the plan was to 
protect the downtown from the “blight” that surrounded it.34 
The plan began with slum removal and redevelopment on the city’s near east side, in the 
heart of Detroit’s Black Bottom.  This became known as the Gratiot Redevelopment Project.35  
The initial reaction to the Detroit Plan was generally positive.  The Detroit News lauded it, 
headlining an editorial “Detroit Leads Again.”  Even the local Black press praised it, mostly 
because slum clearance at the time meant clearance for public housing.36 
 In 1949, the federal government took over most funding for urban renewal through the 
Housing Act of 1949.  This required new housing to be affordable by residents of the cleared 
area, and that residents of slum properties to be removed had to be relocated into “safe, sanitary” 
housing.  Both requirements would prove problematic in Detroit. 
 As early as the late 1930s the City Plan Commission had designated Black Bottom to 
receive public housing for the current African American residents.  However, throughout the 
                                                 
32 The name “Black Bottom” predated the arrival of African Americans to Detroit.  It was named by the first French 
settlers for the color of the soil. 
33 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis:  Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, 
NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2005), 23.  
34 Thomas, 49-51; The Detroit Plan:  A Program for Blight Elimination, Detroit Housing Commission, Box 3, File 
24, Det CPC Gratiot-Orleans Redevelopment, Almblad Collection, Reuther Library, 5. 
35 Thomas, 40, 59, 78, 104-110; Sugrue, 48. 
36 Thomas, 57-58; “Detroit Leads Again,” Detroit News, November 21, 1946; "Court Acts to Clear Slums for 
Projects.  Thousands May Face Ouster From Homes, Businesses,” Michigan Chronicle, March 1, 1947.  
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1930s and 1940s racial tensions around housing in Detroit had been building. World War II 
made matters worse, with a massive influx of blacks and whites from the south to work in 
wartime manufacturing. Racial tensions rose, leading to the worst race riot in U.S. history in 
June 1943.37  
The riot realigned Detroit politics. African-Americans joined in a political coalition with 
left-leaning unionists, but they were defeated in 1943 and 1945 in mayoral campaigns focused on 
housing integration.  The balance of power in the city for two decades would be with forces 
opposed to integrated housing and aligned with the city’s real estate interests.  The election of 
Albert Cobo as mayor in 1949 cemented this coalition in power.38 
Cobo removed all new public housing projects from the city plan.  The Gratiot 
Redevelopment Project was pushed as a priority, but with a focus on supporting downtown 
redevelopment rather than providing new housing for current residents.  By 1950, the project had 
shifted to providing a mix of housing for both low and middle-income residents.39   
The city began to condemn land within the project area in 1947 and demolition continued 
until 1954.  Business owners adjacent to the project area complained that their businesses were 
being subject to “a private depression,” because of delays.  In July 1952, the city asked for bids 
from builders.  But, there were no bids; local developers claimed that the requirement for low-
income housing made the project unprofitable.40 The city modified the requirements in 1953 and 
                                                 
37 Sugrue, 29; Martelle, 147-158. 
38 Sugrue, 80-86;  
39 Sugrue, 86-88. 
40 “Stores Protest Delays in Gratiot Slum Project,” Detroit News, no date, Almblad Collection, Box 3, File 28, 
Reuther Library;  “Slum Clearance and Public Housing in Detroit:  Reviewing the Activities of the Detroit Housing 
Commission for the period from July of 1950 through December of 1951,” 6, Box 3, File 24, Det CPC Gratiot-
Orleans Redevelopment Project, Almblad Collection, Reuther Library; The Detroit Plan:  A Program for Blight 
Elimination, published by the Detroit Housing Commission, 6, Box 3, File 24, Det CPC Gratiot-Orleans 
Redevelopment 1951, Almblad Collection, Reuther Library. 
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made an award to a California developer.  But after a year of planning, that developer withdrew, 
and the city started all over.41 
By now the Mayor was in trouble; the city’s newspapers were publishing embarrassing 
articles about the project and its effects on downtown.  In September 1954 Cobo established the 
non-profit Citizens Redevelopment Corporation (CRC) to run the project.42  Under CRC the 
Gratiot Project became middle-income housing, totally inaccessible to the former residents.  The 
result is what we know today as Lafayette Park, a Modernist superblock with several buildings 
designed by famed architect Mies Van der Rohe.  The project’s first completed apartments were 
opened in 1958, the last in 1964, some seventeen years after the project was announced.43 
The Gratiot Project did nothing the help the poor residents of Black Bottom, since few if 
any of them could afford to live in the housing that replaced theirs. A 1956 survey of families 
dislocated by the project, showed that only 34% had been placed in public housing.  The rest 
were forced to squeeze into what little segregated housing there was for blacks in Detroit.44 
Not only did the project fail to help the residents of the neighborhood, it also failed to 
save downtown.  The long delays in rebuilding removed shoppers and taxpaying businesses from 
an area close to downtown, and it made the area less attractive for an extended period, deterring 
suburban shoppers.   
The Gratiot Project generated relatively little protest.  There were two law suits filed by 
local businesses and the Wayne County CIO.  Both lost in the Michigan Supreme Court in 1951. 
The NAACP and the Urban League complained about the failure of the Housing Commission to 
                                                 
41 Mowitz and Wright, 57-60. 
42 Mowitz and Wright, 51; “Gratiot Project Ready:  Are the Planners?” Detroit Free Press, July 9, 1954. 
43 “Look to the Future,” Detroit News, June 22, 1955.; Mowitz and Wright, 71.  In 2018 the City of Detroit proposed 
to add several new buildings to Lafayette Park. 
44 Mowitz and Wright, 17-19. 
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find replacement housing for the residents of the area.  But, it was not until most residents were 
already gone that it became apparent that only the middle class would benefit.  By then residents 
were too dispersed to protest. However, this did set the stage for more effective protests in future 
projects.45 
The West Side Industrial Redevelopment Project in the Corktown neighborhood took a 
very different trajectory.  This was originally intended to remove the slum to the west of 
downtown and to replace it with warehouses forced to move from downtown by development of 
the Civic Center in the early 1950s.  Corktown was the oldest extant neighborhood in the city, 
with the oldest housing stock and a mixed population of Maltese and Mexican immigrants, as 
well as some African Americans.  In the late 1930s, city planners began to talk about building 
public housing in Corktown, not so much to “replace” the neighborhood as to improve its 
housing stock.46   
As World War II approached its end, and politicians began to get more serious about 
redevelopment, the Pennsylvania Railroad began to lobby the city to rezone a portion in 
Corktown for industrial use.  With real estate interests pushing hard for this, the City Plan 
Commission went along.  At this time, the city’s planners believed the city needed new areas for 
industry to locate since there no large spaces in which to site an industrial plant.  Manufacturing 
firms were leaving for the suburbs and planners worried about losing the industrial tax base.  By 
the late 1940s there was a full-blown debate among the city planners and the real estate 
community about what should go into Corktown.   The planners were convinced that, while the 
city might need more spaces for industry, Corktown was the wrong spot; it was too close to 
                                                 
45 Thomas, 105; Michigan Chronicle, Feb 4, 1950; “Report of the Housing Situation as it Affects the Community in 
the Gratiot Redevelopment Area” Urban League Report GRA 4/51, Gratiot Redevelopment Clipping File, BHC. 
46 Mowitz and Wright, 85-86, 110. 
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downtown.  The real estate community believed otherwise.  Albert Cobo’s election as Mayor in 
1949 turned the tide against the planners.  In 1950, after the election, several professional 
planners resigned in protest over the Mayor’s decision to redevelop Corktown for industry; 
several members of the City Plan Commission either resigned or were fired at the same time over 
the issue.47 
In 1953, as the city began to hold hearings about Corktown redevelopment, the 
community began to organize against it.  Having seen what happened in Black Bottom, which at 
the time was an undeveloped wasteland, the community was strongly against losing their 
neighborhood.  Opposition was led first by two church leaders, Father Clement Kern from the 
Most Holy Trinity Catholic Church, and Reverend John Mangrum of St. Peter’s Episcopal 
Church.  Over time however, leadership shifted to the Corktown Homeowners Association, led 
by Ethel Claes, owner of a local bookstore in Corktown.48 
For five years, residents of the neighborhood attended public hearings in large numbers, 
lobbied the City Council, and wrote letters to the local newspapers.  As many as five hundred 
attended the first City Council hearing on the subject.  Congressman Charles Diggs supported 
their cause both within the Federal government and in local hearings.  Their primary argument 
was that their neighborhood was not a slum and did not deserve to be redeveloped.  The 
Homeowners Association encouraged residents to fix up their properties to demonstrate that this 
was the case.  Moreover, they pointed to statistics about the community, such as crime rates, 
school truancy, etc. that refuted the city planners’ data about the community.  Ethel Claes argued 
that the very idea of moving industry to that location was a bad one.  In a letter to the Detroit 
Times, Claes presciently wrote that industry would find the small area too confining and that the 
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resulting hole in the fabric of the city would “spell downtown’s doom.”  She also pointed out that 
workers in the factories would simply go home to the suburbs, while retaining the residential 
character of the neighborhood would mean more shoppers for downtown.49 
In fact, Corktown was never the total wretched slum described by its detractors; but 
neither was it completely the lively, vibrant community described by Ethel Claes.  Parts of it 
apparently were just a mess, as slum-like as anyone could imagine.  On the other hand, other 
parts had well-maintained homes and lively businesses. Unfortunately, the modernist ideology of 
the city planners could not deal with the disorder implied by such a mixed neighborhood, and the 
racist views of the real estate community could not deal with the idea that a racially mixed 
neighborhood could not only survive but thrive.50 
The hearings and their protests took their toll in the form of delays to the project, but by 
1957 the die was cast.  On July 11, 1957 the City Council voted to proceed with the West Side 
Industrial Redevelopment Project.  In October 1958 the city condemned one hundred and ten 
land parcels (about 75 acres) in Corktown.  Relocation of residents proceeded much more 
smoothly than had been the case for the Gratiot project.  Partly this was because most of the 
residents were white, but the Housing Commission was able to find public housing for most, if 
not all of the relatively few black residents.  The site was cleared of the former residents by 1959, 
some ten years after planning began.51 
The warehouses from downtown never moved to Corktown – the delays caused not only 
by the citizens, but also by the need to work with the Federal government for funding, meant that 
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the warehouses had to find other locations, some outside the city.  Only part of Corktown was 
leveled, as it became increasingly clear that the business appetite for the industrial space was 
limited.  As Claes predicted, the space was too small for most industrial development and it 
never really filled in, creating another hole in Detroit’s city fabric.  Today, what is left of 
Corktown is one of Detroit’s premier gentrifying neighborhoods.52 
 
Conclusions 
 We have seen two eras, and two efforts to rebuild a city, yet with surprisingly similar 
outcomes.  In 1805, the modernist impulses of the new United States resulted in efforts to impose 
a new type of order on a small community on the frontier.  The powers vested in the Governor 
and Judges by Congress enabled Judge Woodward to indulge his urban planning fantasies by 
designing a remarkable plan for a great city, where residents of the actual small town simply 
wanted to get on with their lives. 
Unable to vote the Governor and Judges out of office, the citizens resisted the Woodward 
Plan in the only ways available to them.  First, people refused to cooperate, some by refusing to 
allow surveyors access to their land, others by rebuilding anywhere they wanted.  Second, they 
protested directly to the Federal government.  Third, they helped to create dissension between the 
Governor and the Judges, in hopes of getting at least someone to take their side.  And fourth, 
they counted on their distance from the relatively incompetent new American government to 
slow decision-making.53 
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Because of this resistance, the Woodward Plan was never fully implemented. Yet, full 
implementation might have made future development of the city more expensive, since the 
uniform, rectangular blocks that fill most of the city today are much easier and cheaper for land 
developers to sell than the irregular spaces created by Woodward. That might have slowed the 
rapid automobile-fueled boom in industrial development that resulted in the unplanned, mixed-
use city of the 1940s.  Indeed, it might well have resulted in the center of the auto industry 
residing somewhere else where land was easier to develop into industrial spaces. Did the failure 
of the Woodward Plan enable Detroit to become the Motor City? 
As in 1805, the redevelopment efforts of the 1940s and 1950s also represented the 
modernist view that existing communities should be dismantled to satisfy the vision of an 
external planner.  Planners could exercise this power because government, seeking ways to 
improve the nation’s aging cities, was receptive to the self-serving pleas of the downtown real 
estate community.  Yet in Detroit, those interests did not really know what they were getting into.  
Their efforts to redevelop the inner city to benefit downtown failed catastrophically.   
The nationwide, indeed the transatlantic, failures of urban redevelopment efforts of the 
twentieth century are well-known.  What is less well-understood is how the pattern of those 
failures links back to patterns of behavior from an earlier era.  The Detroit of 1805 served as the 
roots of 1945 Detroit.  Comparing the rebuilding and redevelopment efforts between the two eras 
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